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Summary. We study different aspects of the multiagent resource allocation prob-
lem when the objective is to find an allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare,
the product of the utilities of the individual agents. The Nash solution is an impor-
tant welfare criterion that combines efficiency and fairness considerations. We show
that the problem of finding an optimal outcome is NP-hard for a number of differ-
ent languages for representing agent preferences; we establish new results regarding
convergence to Nash-optimal outcomes in a distributed negotiation framework; and
we design and test algorithms similar to those applied in combinatorial auctions for
computing such an outcome directly.
1.1 Introduction
Multiagent resource allocation (MARA) is a loosely defined research area
concerned with the study of mechanisms for distributing a set of resources
among a group of agents—typically software agents with limited reasoning
capabilities [3]. Each agent has their own preferences (e.g., a utility function)
over the bundles of items they may receive, and the perceived quality of a
chosen outcome (allocation of items to agents) will depend on these individual
preferences.
One quality indicator is (economic) efficiency. The most basic criterion is
Pareto efficiency: an outcome is Pareto efficient if there is no other outcome
that would make one agent better off without harming any of the others. A
stronger criterion is based on utilitarian social welfare: an allocation is op-
timal in this sense if it maximizes the sum of the utilities of the individual
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agents. Both criteria have been widely used in Artificial Intelligence, Multia-
gent Systems and Electronic Commerce. Some recent work in these disciplines
has also recognized the fact that the desideratum of finding efficient alloca-
tions needs to be balanced with appropriate fairness considerations [2, 8, 12],
a dilemma that has long been discussed in Economics, Political Science, and
Philosophy [13]. Fairness criteria include egalitarian social welfare (measuring
quality in terms of the utility experienced by the poorest agent) and envy-
freeness (an allocation is envy-free if no agent would want to change bundle
with any of the others).
In this paper we focus on a criterion that combines aspects of efficiency and
fairness, the Nash social welfare criterion [13]. An outcome maximizes Nash
social welfare if it maximizes the product of the individual agent utilities. This
idea goes back to John Nash’s famous solution to the bargaining problem [14].
While the Nash solution is recognized as being of central importance in the
Economics literature at large, in this paper we shall study it in the context
of two approaches to MARA in which it has received little or no attention to
date.
The first of these is a distributed approach where allocations emerge as
the agents negotiate a sequence of (typically small) local deals, one deal at a
time. This approach has been studied in detail with utilitarian social welfare
as the criterion of choice [19, 8, 7], and to a lesser extent also for various
fairness criteria [8, 4]. Mirroring known results for other welfare criteria, we
show how to define a local criterion for assessing the acceptability of a deal
that will guarantee that a Nash-optimal allocation emerges eventually, and
we highlight some of the limitations of the approach by proving results on the
structural complexity of deals and the length of deal sequences required.
The second approach is based on considering the MARA problem as a
problem faced by some central authority rather than the agents themselves.
This approach is inspired by combinatorial auctions [6]. The standard winner
determination problem in combinatorial auctions is equivalent to the prob-
lem of finding an allocation with maximal utilitarian social welfare, if bids
are taken to reflect actual agent utility. By slightly changing the objective
function in the winner determination problem we arrive at the problem of
computing a Nash-optimal allocation. We exploit this correspondence and
important techniques from the combinatorial auction literature to tackle the
problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 collects
basic definitions on MARA, social welfare, and preference representation. Sec-
tion 1.3 then argues why Nash social welfare is such an important criterion
for measuring the quality of resource allocations and gives complexity results
that show that computing a Nash-optimal allocation is NP-hard. Section 1.4
presents our results on convergence and the length of deal sequences in the
distributed MARA framework, while Section 1.5 presents our winner deter-
mination algorithms for “Nash combinatorial auctions” and provides some
experimental results. Section 1.6 concludes. (Due to space limitations, some
proofs are only sketched and two have been omitted entirely, but full proofs
are available elsewhere [17].)
1.2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the MARA framework we shall use, and review
basic definitions regarding social welfare and preference representation lan-
guages.
1.2.1 Multiagent Resource Allocation
A multiagent resource allocation scenario is defined as a triple 〈A,R,U〉. A
is a finite set of n agents A = {1, . . . , n}; R is a finite set of m resources
R = {r1, . . . , rm}; and U = {u1, . . . , un} is a set of utility functions, one for
each agent. Each ui ∈ U is a mapping from sets of resources to the nonnega-
tive reals: ui : 2R → R+ ∪ {0}. The utility functions model the preferences of
the agents over alternative bundles. An allocation A : A → 2R is a function
mapping agents to sets of resources, such that A(i) ∩ A(j) = ∅ if i 6= j, and⋃n
i=1A(i) = R. A(i) represents the resources that agent i owns in allocation
A, the resources are non-sharable. That is, each allocation A is a partitioning
of all of the resources among the agents. The utility agent i assigns to allo-
cation A is ui(A) = ui(A(i)), by a slight abuse of notation since agents only
care about the resources that they obtain (not others’ bundles).
1.2.2 Collective Utility Functions and Social Welfare Orderings
We now review several criteria for assessing social welfare [13]. A utility profile
for an allocation A is a vector that contains the utility of all agents, i.e., a
vector u(A) = (u1(A), · · · , un(A)) ∈ Rn. A collective utility function (CUF)
is a function W : Rn → R mapping utility profiles to the reals. Most social
welfare criteria can be defined as a CUF. For each CUF, we obtain a cor-
responding social welfare ordering (SWO), a transitive and complete binary
preference relation on utility profiles, by defining the ordering such that one
profile is preferred over another if and only if it has higher collective utility.
As each allocation induces a utility profile, we apply the notions of CUF and
SWO also to allocations.
The utilitarian CUF is defined as the sum of the utilities of all agents;
in our framework: swu(A) =
∑
i∈A ui(A). Hence, the utilitarian SWO favors
allocations in which agents have higher average utility.
The egalitarian CUF, on the other hand, defines the lowest utility of the
profile as the collective utility; here: swe(A) = min{ui(A) | i ∈ A}. Hence,
the egalitarian SWO prefers profiles in which the worst-off agent is better off.
A drawback of the utilitarian CUF is that it only takes average utility
levels into account, and has no reservations for fairness or equality. It would,
for instance, prefer a utility profile (100, 1) to (50, 50), although the latter is
clearly much closer to equality with a very small cost for the total utility.
Conversely, the egalitarian CUF is insensitive to change in overall welfare, as
long as the worst-off agent has better circumstances, e.g. it prefers (25, 25) to
(24, 76) although the second doubles the utility level with a very small cost
for the worst-off agent.
The Nash CUF is defined as the product of the individual agent utili-
ties: swN (A) =
∏
i∈A ui(A). It balances efficiency and fairness, e.g. it prefers
(50, 50) to (100, 1) and (24, 76) to (25, 25), and so it has neither of the pitfalls
of the two previously mentioned CUFs. More formal properties of the Nash
CUF will be discussed in Section 1.3.
1.2.3 Preference representation languages
So far we have only defined an agent’s utility abstractly, as a function u
mapping bundles to numerical values. Any concrete implementation will have
to use a preference representation language for encoding u [3]. In the con-
text of combinatorial auctions, for example, this is the role of the bidding
language [15]. We now briefly review the languages for which we shall give
algorithms in Section 1.5 and complexity results in Section 1.3.2.
The most basic language is the explicit form; it simply lists for each bun-
dle S the value u(S), unless that value is 0. The XOR-language from the
combinatorial auction literature [20] is essentially the same language, except
that here an implicit monotonicity assumption is being made: a bid such as
〈S1, p1〉xor · · · xor 〈Sn, pn〉, where the Si ∈ 2R are bundles and the pi ∈ R+
are prices, defines the utility function u with u(X) = max1≤i≤n{pi | X ⊇ Si}.
The OR-language is similar: here the value of a bundle is the maximal sum of
prices achievable by selecting a set of non-overlapping atomic bids [15].
The language of positive cubes belongs to the family of languages based on
weighted propositional formulas [22]. The basic idea is to identify resources
with propositional variables. A goalbase G is a set of pairs {(ϕj , wj)}j , where
each ϕj is a propositional formula over these variables and each wj ∈ R
is a weight. For the language of positive cubes, each ϕj is required to be a
conjunction of positive literals. Then the utility function u induced by goalbase
G is defined via u(X) =
∑{w | (ϕ,w) ∈ G and X |= ϕ)}.3 For example, given
the goalbase {(p, 5), (p∧ q, 2)}, our agent would value bundle {p} at 5, bundle
{q} at 0, and bundle {p, q} at 7. Positive cubes of length ≤ k are equivalent
to the well-known class of k-additive functions [10]. We will be specifically
interested in the restriction of the language where all weights have to be
positive.
3 The consequence relation |= is defined in the obvious way; for positive cubes ϕ it
amounts to X |= ϕ if and only if each of the conjuncts in ϕ is an element of X.
1.3 Nash Social Welfare: Axiomatics and Complexity
In this section we discuss some properties of the Nash CUF/SWO defined ear-
lier. We review its axiomatic characterization and we analyze its complexity.
1.3.1 Axiomatic Characterization of Nash Social Welfare
The Nash SWO encourages both increases in overall utility in a society and
improved equality among agents, which is an important factor for assessing
fairness and collective welfare. More formally, the Nash SWO can be charac-
terized by a set of axioms that represent some generally desirable properties
for an SWO, and thus justify its position as one of the most important social
welfare orderings in the literature.
Before we review these axioms, note that it is only meaningful to define
the Nash SWO when the utility functions are nonnegative, since if some util-
ities are negative, the outcome of the Nash CUF would not be continuous
(with respect to changes in the individual utilities), and would fluctuate un-
reasonably between positive and negative values depending on whether the
number of individuals with negative utilities is even or odd. Also, for some of
our results, it is required for the utility profiles to be strictly positive, because
a single zero in the profile would make the rest of the profile irrelevant, which
is not desirable. Sometimes replacing zeros with very small positive values can
be useful, as it keeps the value of the CUF low, without losing sensitivity to
the other values in the profile.
Following Moulin [13], we now sketch the unique properties of the Nash
SWO. The Nash SWO, along with the utilitarian SWO and a generalized
version of the egalitarian SWO (called the leximin ordering) are the main
representatives of a family of social welfare orderings characterized by three
important axioms:
• Independence of unconcerned agents: Agents whose utility levels are the
same in two utility profiles should not have an effect on the ordering of
the profiles. This is in line with the assumption that agents’ happiness
depends on their own utilities only.
• Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: An SWO that satisfies this principle
prefers or is at least indifferent to any change that involves only two
agents and that is both mean-preserving and inequality-reducing as far
as the utilities of these two agents are concerned. This is the most basic
fairness principle.
• Independence of common utility scale: Re-scaling the utility functions of
all agents with the same factor should not affect the SWO. That is, the
ordering should not change if all agents scale their utilities with the same
factor, e.g., if they use a different currency.
In addition to these axioms, which are clearly reasonable and desirable for
an SWO, the Nash SWO is uniquely identified by being independent of the
individual scale of utilities: the SWO remains the same even if each agent
rescales his utility function using a different factor, This property ensures
that the Nash CUF eliminates the possibility of manipulation by means of
changing the scale used by an individual agent; examples for this can be
found in [13, 17].
1.3.2 Computational complexity
Next we analyse the computational complexity of the problem of finding an
allocation that maximises Nash social welfare. We shall assume basic famil-
iarity with the theory of NP-completeness [16]. The decision variant of the
Nash Welfare Optimisation problem is defined as follows:
Nash Welfare Optimisation (Nash)
Given: Resource allocation scenario 〈A,R,U〉 and K ∈ Q.
Question: Is there an allocation A such that swN (A) > K?
The precise complexity of Nash will depend on the language used to repre-
sent U . First, consider the related problem MaxUtil: given a single utility
function u and some K ∈ Q, is there a bundle S such that u(S) > K?
MaxUtil is known to be NP-hard for a number of representation languages,
including the OR-language [18] and the language of positive cubes with ar-
bitrary (positive and negative) weights [22]. For these languages, we obtain
NP-hardness of Nash as an immediate corollary (because MaxUtil is equiv-
alent to Nash for societies consisting of just a single agent). On the other
hand, for the XOR-language, for the explicit form, and for positive cubes
with positive weights, MaxUtil is trivial and cannot be used to establish
complexity results for Nash.
We now prove complexity results for the two languages for which we shall
provide algorithms in Section 1.5.
Theorem 1. Nash is NP-complete if the XOR-language is used, even when
each agent only assigns a value to a single bundle.
Proof. If each agent only values a single bundle, then the XOR-language is
equivalent to the OR-language; and for this case Utilitarian Welfare Opti-
misation is known to be NP-hard [18, 3]. Given that there is a polynomial
reduction from that problem to Nash (replace each price p in the bids by
2p), NP-hardness of Nash follows. NP-membership also holds: if an oracle
produces an allocation A, it is possible to verify in polynomial time whether
swN (A) > K. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Nash is NP-complete if the language of positive cubes with pos-
itive weights is used, even when each agent only assigns a value to a single
bundle.
Proof. Again, for the case where each agent only attaches a non-zero weight
to a single bundle (cube), positive cubes with positive weights work exactly
as the OR-language. Hence, the same proof as given for Theorem 1 applies.
uunionsq
While the proofs given are basically the same, we emphasise that neither of
the two theorems entails the other. This is so, because neither of the two
languages is as succinct as the other in all cases [5].
1.4 Distributed Approach
We now apply the tools of a distributed approach to MARA [19, 8, 7] to
the problem of optimizing Nash social welfare. In this framework, there is no
central authority and agents are free to negotiate allocations by means of deals
over some of their exchanging resources. The main appeal of such a model
is that the agents can be designated as independent entities (e.g., software
programs) that make decisions based on their locally available information
only. The computational costs can also be distributed among the agents in
this way. Throughout this section, it is assumed that all utility functions are
strictly positive.
1.4.1 Deals
We assume that the agents start out in an initial allocation, and can agree
on deals that result in changes in the allocation. A deal δ = (A,A′) is a an
ordered pair of distinct allocations (before/after). The set of agents involved
in δ is Aδ = {i ∈ A|A(i) 6= A′(i)}. This definition of a deal is very broad and
may involve the reallocation many resources among many agents.
1.4.2 Convergence and Necessity
Previous work has shown that deals that satisfy myopic individual rationality
are sufficient for guaranteeing that any sequence of such deals will result in
an allocation that maximizes the utilitarian CUF [19]. Here we try to obtain
a similar result for the Nash CUF. Consider the following class of deals: A
deal δ = (A,A′) is called a Nash deal if
∏
i∈Aδ ui(A) <
∏
i∈Aδ ui(A
′). That
is, a Nash deal is a deal that locally increases the Nash CUF; it increases the
Nash CUF of those involved in the deal. We obtain the following convergence
theorem.
Theorem 3. Starting from any initial allocation, any sequence of Nash deals
will eventually lead to a Nash-optimal allocation.
Proof. First, it is not difficult to verify that a deal is a Nash deal if and only if
it increases Nash social welfare. The claim then follows from the fact that the
set of possible allocations is finite: Nash social welfare must strictly increase
with each deal, so an optimal allocation will be reached eventually. uunionsq
The theorem shows that any sequence of Nash deals is guaranteed to culmi-
nate in an optimal outcome and the process of negotiation cannot get stuck
in a local optimum. This is particularly interesting since agents can choose
the deals only depending on the effect that particular deal has within their
local group. On the other hand, it must be recognized that our notion of
Nash deal is conceptually less satisfying than the corresponding notion of my-
opic individual rationality used in the literature on distributed approaches
to computing allocations with maximal utilitarian social welfare [19, 8]. The
drawback is that agents need to share information on their utilities (even if
just locally, i.e., within the group of agents participating in a specific deal)
before an individual can decide whether or not a deal is acceptable to them.
Also, the mechanism is not incentive-compatible (a requirement that is diffi-
cult to meet when fairness rather than just efficiency is sought). Nevertheless,
whenever agents can be assumed to be cooperative, Theorem 3 shows that
finding a Nash-optimal allocation can be left to a procedure requiring no cen-
tral coordination.
A relevant question that arises at this point is how complicated the deals
needed in the process may be. We continue with two results on the structural
complexity of the Nash deals used in the negotiation process. The first is
similar to a known result from the literature [8]. It makes use of the concept of
independently decomposable deals: δ = (A,A′) is independently decomposable
if there are two deals δ1 = (A,A′′) and δ2 = (A′′, A′) such that Aδ1 ∩Aδ2 = ∅.
Theorem 4. For any set of agents and resources, for any particular deal δ
that is not independently decomposable there exist a choice of utility functions
and an initial allocation such that δ would have to be included in any sequence
of Nash deals that leads to a Nash-optimal allocation.
The proof (omitted for lack of space) involves the construction of utility func-
tions and a non-optimal initial allocation so that δ is the only applicable Nash
deal [17]. This necessity result shows that when using Nash deals to reach a
Nash-optimal allocation, it may be necessary to use any deal that is not inde-
pendently decomposable, no matter how complex it may be, and such deals
may even involve all agents and all resources.
Now, it could still be possible to contain the structural complexity of
deals if we impose constraints on the agents’ utility functions. The following
result shows that even restricting utility functions to the very narrow class of
modular functions is not useful to this effect. A modular utility function u is
one for which u(X) = α∅ +
∑
r∈X α
r, where α∅ = u(∅) and αr = u({r}).
Theorem 5. For any set of agents and resources, if the number of resources is
not less than the number of the agents, there exist a choice of utility functions
and an initial allocation such that when only Nash deals are used, a deal
that involves all agents may be necessary in order to reach a Nash-optimal
allocation. This holds even if all utility functions are required to be modular.
Proof. Suppose we have a distributed negotiation problem where the number
of resources are at least as as many as the agents (m ≥ n). Let A be any
allocation in which each agent i owns resource ri, ri ∈ A(i). We will use three
parameters M , d, and  in defining the utilities. Suppose that 0 <  < d < M .
We shall show that it is always possible to define these parameters such that
a deal involving all agents would be necessary to reach the Nash optimal
allocation.
The utility functions in modular form are defined such that αrii = d − 
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αri−1i = M −  for all 1 < i ≤ n, αrn1 = M − , and α∅i = 
for all i. This means that each agent gives utility d to allocation A, M to
allocation A′ that can be reached from A if agent i gives the resource ri to
agent (i mod n)+1 and  to cases where they have neither of their two desired
items.
So we have swN (A) = dn and swN (A′) = Mn. Now for any deal starting
from A in which the agents do not trade in the cycle specified above that takes
A to A′, the utility of the agents would not increase since either resources that
are redundant in the outcome (ri with i > n) would be traded, or at least one
of the agents would be deprived of the resource he values d, and his utility
would drop to , without the utility of another agent increasing.
Thus the only other deals we have to consider are deals that involve trading
on the specified cycle, but do not complete it. Any deal of this sort of length
i has the same effect. It will reduce the utility of the first agent in the chain
from d to , increase the utility of the last agent to M+d−, and increase the
utility of the agents in between to M . In order for A′ to be the only allocation
that improves upon the utility of A, we need to define the parameters such
that the Nash CUF is smaller than that of A in allocations resulting from all
of these deals. The length of such deals can be between 1 and n − 1, so we
must have Mk−2(M + d− ) < dk for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
It is easy to see that for any M , d and n, there exists an  that satisfies
 <
dn
Mn−2(M + d)
,
and that it satisfies all of the other inequalities as well. So A′ is the only
allocation with Nash social welfare higher than A, and thus starting from A,
the deal (A,A′) that involves all agents would be necessary [19]. uunionsq
1.4.3 Communication Complexity
Next, we investigate the number of deals needed to reach an optimal alloca-
tion, and prove two kinds of upper bounds on it. This aspect of the complexity
of a distributed negotiation framework has been termed communication com-
plexity [7] (this is different from, albeit inspired by, the use of the term in
Theoretical Computer Science [24]). In our first approach to this question, we
would like to know how many Nash deals are absolutely required in a sequence
of deals that leads to an optimal allocation.
Theorem 6. Starting with any initial allocation, it is always possible to reach
a Nash-optimal allocation with at most one Nash deal.
Proof. It is always possible to reach an optimal allocation with a deal from
the initial allocation to the optimal one, unless the initial allocation is itself
optimal, in which case no deal is needed. uunionsq
The more interesting question here does not involve the shortest negotiation
sequence, but the longest one. The next result gives an upper bound on how
long a negotiation process can get in the worst case, but we first need to prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. It is possible to define utility functions such that any two distinct
allocations have different Nash social welfare.
Proof. Let us assign to each agent i a prime number Pi so that Pi 6= Pj
whenever i 6= j. Now suppose each agent has an ordering on all possible
bundles, and ui(R) = (Pi)j if R is the jth bundle in agent i’s ordering. For
any two distinct allocations A and A′, there must be an agent k whose bundle
is different in these two allocations. So the power of Pk is different in swN (A)
and swN (A′). Since any natural number has a unique prime factorization,
swN (A) 6= swN (A′). uunionsq
Above lemma lies at the heart of the following proof. Whenever all allocations
have distinct values, we can get a sequence of Nash deals of the maximal size:
Theorem 7. Any sequence of Nash deals can consist of at most |A||R| − 1
deals.
Proof. There are a total of |A||R| allocations. By Lemma 1, there are utility
functions for which each allocation has a different Nash CUF value. Then,
if the initial allocation is the one with the least Nash CUF, and we traverse
through all allocations in order of increasing Nash CUF, we obtain a sequence
of |A||R| − 1 deals, all of which are Nash deals. uunionsq
1.5 Centralized Approach: Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are centralized variants of MARA. Instead of having
the agents agree on an allocation interactively, they express their preferences
as bids and a central authority, the auctioneer, computes an optimal alloca-
tion for them. In the standard case, the auctioneer is expected to compute
an allocation that maximizes the utilitarian CUF (and thus revenue for the
auctioneer). This is called the winner determination problem (WDP). Here
we aim at optimizing the Nash CUF and call the corresponding problem the
Nash WDP.
The exact definition of the WDP and the design of algorithms for solving
it, both in the standard case and for our Nash combinatorial auctions, cru-
cially depend on the bidding language used to encode the individual agents’
preferences [15]. In this section, we shall present algorithms for solving the
Nash WDP for two languages: the XOR-language and the language of pos-
itive cubes with positive weights. Theorems 1 and 2 show that both these
problems are NP-hard. In the first case, we use integer programming, in the
second an algorithm based on heuristic-guided search.
1.5.1 Winner Determination for the XOR-Language
If agent utilities are modeled using the XOR-language, then we can represent
the WDP as an integer programming (IP) problem [21]. This means that,
in this case, there are very powerful off-the-shelf tools available for solving
the WDP. The downside of this approach is that the XOR-language is not a
compact preference representation language: agents have to explicitly list all
the bundles they have an interest in.
Suppose each bidder has submitted an XOR-combination of atomic bids,
associating a price with a bundle of goods. Let 〈Sij , pij〉 be the bundle/price
pair that is the jth atomic bid of the ith bidder. We introduce a binary
decision variable xij for each 〈Sij , pij〉. (Index i ranges from 1 to the number
of bidders; j ranges for each i from 1 to the number of atomic bids submitted
by bidder i.) Solving the Nash WDP then amounts to solving the following
integer program:
Maximize
∑
ij xij · log pij , subject to
(i)
∑
j xij ≤ 1 for each bidder i, and
(ii)
∑{xij | r ∈ Sij} ≤ 1 for each resource r.
Constraint (i) encodes the semantics of the XOR-language and constraint (ii)
ensures that each item is sold at most once. That is, we are simply using the
standard IP formulation for the standard WDP with the logarithms of the
prices, exploiting the relationship between utilitarian and Nash social welfare.
Unfortunately, for compact representation languages, such as the OR-
language or weighted propositional formulas, this approach is not applicable.
The reason is that here prices (utilities) are computed as the sum of several
partial prices that a bidder has assigned to certain bundles/formulas, and the
Nash CUF is the product of these sums. So the “trick” of using logarithms
does not work anymore. There are IP solutions for the standard WDP for
weighted propositional formulas [1], but it is unclear whether they could be
adapted to our problem. Certainly, as Nash social welfare is defined in terms of
multiplication, the Nash WDP cannot be stated directly as a linear program.
1.5.2 Winner Determination for the Positive Cubes Language
Here we consider the Nash WDP when the preferences are represented using
the positive cubes language (with positive weights) defined in Section 1.2. We
propose a heuristic for pruning the search tree and prove that it is admissible
and also conduct some experiments and report their results.
Heuristic Algorithm
Various studies have been carried out on algorithms and particularly heuristic-
guided search methods for solving the WDP for classical bidding languages
[9, 20]. The positive cubes language has also been considered for the standard
WDP in [23]; we follow this approach for the Nash WDP.
We construct a search tree, each of its nodes being a partial allocation and
the leaves complete allocations. A partial allocation is similar to an allocation,
except that some of the items may not be assigned to any agent. The root
of the tree is the partial allocation in which no resources have been assigned
yet. Each child of a node corresponds to the allocation that is the result of
assigning one more item to one of the agents. Thus each node has |A| = n
children, and the depth of the tree is |R| = m.
The algorithm is an A? search that uses a heuristic estimate to guide
search on this tree. For each node (or accordingly partial allocation) an ac-
quired value (g) and an estimated heuristic value (h) is computed. The A?
algorithm expands the nodes in order of highest heuristic estimate value. So
if the heuristic estimate of a node is less than the acquired value of another
node that has already been seen it has no chance of being expanded further
in the search.
The acquired value of any partial allocation is computed as the product
of the acquired value of each agent, which is in turn the sum of the weights
of cubes for which the agent already owns all the corresponding resources.
The heuristic estimate for each partial allocation is the the product of the
heuristic estimates of all the agents. Each agent’s heuristic estimate is the
sum of the weights of cubes for which the agent still has a chance of getting
all corresponding resources, i.e., none of the resources have already been given
to someone else in the partial allocation. This heuristic can be shown to be
admissible, i.e., it never underestimates the true value of the Nash CUF of
allocations that can be obtained by completing the partial allocation at any
given node [17].
Theorem 8. The function h defined above is an admissible heuristic for the
Nash WDP problem when preferences are represented using the language of
positive cubes with positive weights.
Thus the heuristic-led search will always yield a Nash-optimal allocation since
it will never skip a node that can possibly lead to an optimal allocation.
Experimental Results
Fig. 1.1. The comparison of the number of nodes generated by the heuristic method
and brute force search. The horizontal axis is the number of resources, the vertical
axis is the logarithm in base 10 of the number of nodes of the tree generated.
N is the number of total nodes of the search tree. n(ave), n(min), and n(max)
are the average, minimum and maximum of the number of nodes generated in the
experiments respectively.
We have implemented the presented heuristic algorithm and run some
experiments to test its performance.4
For generating the test cases we have used a simple random algorithm.
Note that it would have been more desirable to use more “realistic” test data,
of the kind generated by the CATS software [11], a standard benchmark for
generating test cases for combinatorial auctions. However, this was not pos-
sible because CATS does not support logic-based languages. For generating
the test cases, half of each agent’s goalbase formulas are generated so that
each of the propositional formulas has a 20% chance of containing each of
the variables. The other half of the formulas of these goalbases each con-
tain a single variable, these are also determined randomly. The weights are
then determined by assigning each resource a nominal value and computing
the weight of each bundle using that value as an estimate. This is generally
appealing since it reduces the chance of having very long formulas without
eliminating it altogether, and also ensures that there is a higher number of
smaller formulas.
The implementation is a Java program and the experiments have been
run on a Fedora Linux operating system on an Intel Pentium 4 with 3.00GHz
4 The framework of the source code used to implement the algorithm was written
by Joel Uckelman, and is the same as that used to run the experiments in [23].
CPU and 1 GB of RAM. It should be noted here that we have used the best-
estimate first branching policy of [23]. This means that in each step the next
good to be allocated is one of the goods that has the best estimate according
to the heuristic presented in that article.
In order to assess the efficiency of the algorithm we have compared the
runtime and number of nodes created in the heuristic algorithm with a brute
force search that traverses all nodes of the search tree. For any number of
resources between 5 and 17, we generated a setting consisting of 50 MARA
scenarios containing 5 agents randomly using the method explained above.
The average, minimum, and maximum number of nodes in each setting is
shown in Fig. 1.1; the runtime of the algorithm is proportional to the number
of nodes generated and is for example on average 0.58 seconds for 10 resources
and 107 seconds for 17 resources. As is clear from the figure, the variation of
runtimes and number of nodes generated for problems of the same size is
rather high.
Although the heuristic works much better than brute force search, its run-
time increases rather quickly itself. In fact, in the results for these experiments
it can be observed that the runtime of the heuristic algorithm and hence the
number of nodes, roughly doubles with the addition of each extra item. Note
that since the runtime of the algorithm preserves a roughly constant propor-
tion with the number of nodes even in the larger cases, the experiments do
not seem to run into problems with memory, thus employing other informed
search methods with the same heuristic (e.g., a branch-and-bound method)
would probably not lead to significantly improved results since the A? algo-
rithm will provably generate a smaller search tree than any other method
using the same heuristic.
It is important to keep in mind that the performance of this algorithm
is not comparable to state-of-the art algorithms for combinatorial auctions.
Our main purpose here has been to demonstrate that techniques from the
combinatorial auction literature can in principle be applied to optimizing Nash
social welfare, but this is only the first step in designing efficient algorithms
in this regard.
1.6 Conclusion
We have presented a number of results pertaining to the quest of finding
allocations that are optimal with respect to the notion of Nash social welfare,
similar to those that have been obtained for other kinds of efficiency and
fairness criteria in different parts of the literature on multiagent resource
allocation.
First, we have shown that this is an NP-hard optimization problems, for
several languages for encoding the problem. Second, in the context of a well-
studied distributed negotiation framework, we have obtained a simple con-
vergence result, and we have relativized this result by showing that deals of
high structural complexity may be required during convergence and that the
number of deals in a sequence leading to the optimum may be exponential.
Third, we have shown that it can be instructive to view the problem of finding
a Nash-optimal allocation as a variant of the winner determination problem
in combinatorial auctions. We have presented two algorithms, for different
preference representation languages: one using integer programming (for a en
explicit representation of agent utilities) and one using heuristic-guided search
(for a more sophisticated compact representation of the problem input). Fi-
nally, we have reported on initial experiments with the latter algorithm. While
our experiments clearly show that there is still room for improvement, we be-
lieve to have been able to demonstrate that Nash social welfare is not only an
important quality criterion, but that it is also a criterion that can be tack-
led successfully with the variety of methods that have been developed in the
multiagent resource allocation community.
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